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Abstract 
People tend to derogate their ideological opponents. But how does social status affect this 
tendency? We tested a prediction derived from hierometer theory that people with higher 
status would derogate ideological opponents less (i.e., evaluate them more charitably). We 
further predicted that greater rhetoric handling prowess (RHP: feeling more confident and 
less intimidated while arguing) would mediate the effect. Study 1 established a link between 
higher status and lesser opponent derogation correlationally. Study 2 did so experimentally. 
Using a scale to assess RHP developed and validated in Study 3, Study 4 established that 
RHP statistically mediated the correlational link between status and derogation. In Study 5, 
experimentally manipulating status affected RHP as predicted. However, in Study 6, 
experimentally manipulating RHP did not affect opponent derogation as predicted. Thus, our 
findings were substantially, but not entirely, consistent with our theoretically-derived 
predictions. Implications for hierometer theory, and related theoretical approaches, are 
considered. 
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“You know—just to be grossly generalist—you could put half of Trump’s supporters 
into what I call the basket of deplorables—right? The racist, sexist, xenophobic, 
homophobic, Islamophobic—you name it.” 
— Hillary Clinton, September 9, 2016, New York City 
 
The opening quote—greeted with laughter and applause at a rally in the run up to the 
divisive 2016 US Presidential Election (Durden, 2016)—illustrates vividly how people tend 
to hold those with whom they disagree in lower regard than those with whom they agree, 
especially where the bone of contention matters. Empirical research amply bears out the 
anecdotal example. For example, Grossmann and Hopkins (2015, Table 5, p. 129) examined 
a subsample of respondents surveyed by the American National Election Studies in 2000, all 
of whom had donated at least $200 towards their preferred congressional candidate. These 
partisans expressed far warmer sentiments towards ideological allies than towards ideological 
opponents. Specifically, along a 0-to-100 feeling thermometer, the average ratings were 71 
versus 24 for Democrats, and 79 versus 14 for Republicans. More generally, research 
conducted under the rubric of the similarity-produces-liking hypothesis confirms that 
attitudinal agreement fosters interpersonal amity. There remains some dispute over whether 
an overlap in attitudes prompts more favorable evaluations, conducive to interpersonal 
attraction (Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986), or whether discrepancies between attitudes 
prompt less favorable evaluations, conducive to interpersonal repulsion (Rosenbaum, 1986). 
Recently, Garcia, Bergsieker, and Shelton (2015) provided an illustration of how attitudinal 
discrepancies affected interpersonal liking both among long-established friends and recently 
acquainted strangers, and in ways that reflects intergroup dynamics. In a racially mixed US 
sample, they found that Black participants—for whom racial issues loom larger, and whose 
social standing is more precarious—were especially prone to dislike other Black participants 
if their attitudes on race diverged. 
Considerations concerning the structure of society lead us to the specific question we 
address in this article: How does social status affect opponent derogation? Does having 
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higher status lead one to derogate those with whom one disagrees more or less? At first blush, 
higher status might seem to prompt greater derogation. Society, after all, is hierarchically 
stratified: People occupy a particular social rank, either enviably higher or regrettably lower 
(Fiske, 2010). Moreover, this stratification has often been interpreted as reflective of systemic 
dominance and oppression (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). If so, then people of higher status, as 
part of the hegemonic elite, might be expected to look down upon others, thereby 
compounding the degree to which they would derogate them if they happened to disagree, as 
obeisance would be preferred. On the other hand, recent theorists have conceptualized status 
more benignly. They note that, both geographically and historically, so-called WEIRD 
societies (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Heinrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010) tend to afford their members, at least comparatively speaking, reasonable 
opportunities for cooperative self-advancement, such that they need not grab status 
aggressively in a regime defined by dominance, but may be granted status consensually in a 
polity predicated on prestige (De Waal-Andrews, Gregg, & Lammers, 2015; Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). In particular, exhibiting an abundance of altruism (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006) 
or virtue (Bai, 2017) facilitates status attainment in experimental groups. In light of such 
findings, status has come to be defined as respect, admiration, and importance in the eyes of 
others (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). If so, then people of higher status—perhaps 
out of a sense of noblesse oblige (Riddick, Cummins, Janicki, Lee, & Erlich, 2013)—might 
be expected to make allowance for others, thereby attenuating the degree to which they 
would derogate them if they happened to disagree. 
However, the basis for these predictions is somewhat loose and speculative. The same 
would also be true of attempts to infer the impact of status on opponent derogation from 
whether or not status generally promotes prosocial or antisocial outcomes in general. The 
evidence here, in any case, is mixed, with some signs that status makes people less 
empathetic and helpful (Guinote, Cotzia, Sandhu, & Siwa, 2015; Kraus, Cote, and Keltner, 
2010), and other signs that it makes them less prone to conflict and more inclined to be fair, 
especially having statistically controlled for correlated constructs such as power (Anicich, 
Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2016; Blader & Chen, 2012). Accordingly, we derive a prediction 
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more specifically, on the basis of an extension to a theory that we have recently put forward: 
hierometer theory (Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & De Waal-Andrews, 2016). 
Hierometer Theory 
 Hierometer theory was developed to advance understanding of the evolutionary 
function of self-esteem (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000). A 
leading complementary theory of self-esteem’s function, sociometer theory, was ambiguous 
across different expositions as to whether self-esteem derived from inclusion—in the specific 
sense of being liked, loved, and accepted by a group to which one belongs (Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, & Downs, 1995)—or from any number of sources that might contribute in the 
aggregate to one’s relational value (Leary, 2005). One particular source was status—in the 
specific sense, defined above, of being respected, admired, and considered important (for an 
enumeration of other sources, see: Gebauer et al., 2015; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001). 
Hierometer theory focuses specifically on status, thereby delineating self-esteem’s 
sociometric (inclusion-tracking) function from its hierometric (status-tracking) one. The 
theory posits that self-esteem adaptively tracks status so as to orient people towards being 
more or less keen to enter competitive contests, in keeping with their greater or lesser 
capacity to engage in these contests successfully thanks to competitive advantages or 
disadvantages afforded to them by their higher or lower status. Advantages or disadvantages 
would include having more or fewer human fans whose advocacy and support could be called 
upon if needed, as well as a greater or smaller fund of resources earned in exchange for 
furnishing goods or services that those fans valued.1 Consistent with this formulation, higher 
status predicts greater behavioral assertiveness, with the link being statistically mediated by 
levels of self-esteem (Mahadevan et al., 2016).2  
A key point is this: Being more or less motivated to enter competitive contests entails 
at a psychological level the adoption of more or less extreme attitudes towards one’s 
opponents in such contests. One may safely assume that, on average, opponents will be 
evaluated negatively. However, the degree of negative evaluation is liable to vary. In 
particular, the higher one’s status, and the greater one’s felt capacity to compete, the less of a 
threat one’s opponent will be regarded as being. Conversely, the lower one’s status, and the 
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lesser one’s felt capacity to complete, the greater a threat one’s opponent will be regarded as 
being. All else equal, therefore, being lower status should prompt more negative evaluations 
of one’s opponents, whom one would be more likely to be defeated by, whereas higher status 
should prompt less negative evaluations of one’s opponents, whom one would be more likely 
to prevail against. 
For example, consider a job candidate. She may be expected not to look too kindly 
upon competing job candidates. However, if her status is higher, she will—all else equal—be 
more confident about beating them, and less intimidated by the prospect of going up against 
them. Regarding herself as more respected, admired, and important—characteristics that are 
liable to reflect others’ objective opinions (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 
2006)—puts her in a frame of mind where opponents, because they seem less formidable, 
need not be so feared. And this may well be justified: she may, for example, have letters of 
recommendation reflecting the respect and admiration she has earned from previous 
employers, which in turn causally underlie her confident frame of mind. At all events, not 
fearing the other candidates as much as she otherwise would, entails—all else equal—having 
a relatively less negative evaluation of them. In an absolute sense, she might still derogate 
them, because they still present some threat, or because, simply as strangers, she has a limited 
basis for liking them; however, her greater status would make the level of derogation less 
than it would otherwise be. 
The Linguistic Hierometer Hypothesis 
 The question arises, however, as to why hierometer theory should apply to attitudinal 
disagreements. Why should non-correspondence between the truth-values assigned to 
propositions in the heads of different people be a cause for conflict at all? Among amicable 
academics, disputing arcane topics, perhaps it need not. However, ideas have implications, 
and precipitate action (von Mises, 1963). Especially on “hot” topics—of a political, religious, 
or ethical nature—attitudinal disagreement is a diagnostic sign of realistic conflict, albeit 
latent rather than manifest. 
Furthermore, at a more fundamental level, beliefs can be considered the psychological 
equivalent of personal possessions (Abelson, 1986; Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017a) 
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which people wish to retain, or some occupied land which people which to expand (Saucier 
& Webster, 2010). That is, people relate psychologically to their beliefs partly as if they were 
physical objects or extended spaces: they can be mentally materialistic and ideologically 
territorial (Gregg & Mahadevan, 2014; Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017b). That this is 
the case is powerfully suggested by the metaphorical terms used to describe beliefs and 
process of argumentation over them. For example, like physical objects, beliefs can be held, 
acquired, and abandoned; and they can be cherished, such that one would be loath to lose 
them. Moreover, like physical conflicts, arguments over beliefs can be won or lost, by 
opponents on different sides, who attack one another’s positions or defend their own, by 
making incisive points or parrying objections. In line with this idea, measures of mental 
materialism and ideological territoriality are inversely related to an index of rational 
objectivity (Gregg et al., 2017b). 
This being the case, the psychological dynamics that regulate entry into competitive 
contests, which are ethologically rooted in physical combat (Parker, 1974), are also liable to 
regulate engagement in ideological conflicts, conducted solely via language (Aitchison, 2011). 
Accordingly, we put forward the linguistic hierometer hypothesis, which states that levels of 
status and corresponding self-perceptions operate functionally to regulate entry into 
argumentative contests specifically in the same way that hierometer theory states that they 
operate functionally to regulate entry into competitive contests generally. In particular, 
whereas having higher rank in non-human animals leads to an increase in their resource 
holding potential (Parker, 1974), thereby regulating their entry into physical contests, higher 
status in humans leads to an increase in their rhetoric handling prowess, thereby regulating 
their entry into argumentative contests. Rhetoric handling prowess—as the mediating 
variable between status and opponent derogation—would be reflected in a sense of greater 
confidence and lesser intimidation.  
STUDY 1 
Study 1 represented our first attempt to establish the presence, size, and specificity of 
the hypothesized inverse link between status—our independent variable—and opponent 
derogation—our dependent variable. For this purpose, we adopted a cross-sectional design, 
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operationalizing our key constructs at the level of traits. For the sake of coverage, we 
operationalized opponent derogation in two ways: first, as evaluations of the intelligence of 
those with whom one disagrees; and second, as evaluations of the morality of those with 
whom one disagrees (cf. Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998).  
In addition, for the sake of discriminant validity, we concurrently examined how 
inclusion played into this hypothesized link. As such, inclusion constitutes a conceptually 
close, but still distinct, construct, and one whose operationalization is likely subject to similar 
methodological biases. Both facts make it highly suited as a statistical control variable. Also, 
given that social inclusion is linked to behavioral amiability (Mahadevan et al., 2016), there 
are independent grounds for suspecting it might predict more positive evaluations of 
ideological opponents, thereby rendering it a relevant comparative benchmark.  
Method 
Platform, Procedure, and Participants 
We ran the study online, as part of a larger survey lasting about one hour.3 We created 
its content using iSurvey (University of Southampton, 2015), and crowdsourced participants 
(paying $3.00 each) via the leading platform CrowdFlower. Participants read an information 
sheet, indicated consent by checking a box, completed the survey, and were subsequently 
debriefed. 
Crowdsourcing generally provides high quality data (Buhrmeister, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Germaine et al., 2012). Nonetheless, to maximize data quality, we excluded 
non-trivial cases on the basis of several standard criteria (Appendix A). Our final sample 
comprised 722 participants. This N permitted us to detect a medium-sized correlation (r = .30) 
at a conventional alpha level (α = .05) with a probability near unity (P > .99). The majority 
were female (61.1%), younger (MAGE = 36.0; SDAGE = 11.7), and Western (USA: 47.5%; UK: 
26.6%; Canada: 18.4%; Others: 7.5%). 
Measures 
Independent variables. We assessed participants’ status and inclusion with two self-
report scales, respectively containing eight items (α = .91) and nine items (α = .93) 
(Mahadevan et al., 2016; Mahadevan, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2017a). Both featured the same 
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five response options (strongly disagree, generally disagree, neither agree nor disagree, 
generally agree, strongly agree), and subsequently scaled from -2 to +2. All items began with 
the same sentence stem (“Most of the time, I feel that people…”) and ended with different 
sentence completions. Sample items: “…see me as an important person” (status); “…see me 
as fitting in” (inclusion). 
Dependent variables. We assessed participants’ attitudes towards ideological 
opponents with two self-report scales, one enquiring into the intelligence of those opponents, 
and the other into their morality. As we expected ideological opponents to be derogated, we 
termed these indices Derogation of Ideological Opponent Scales (DIOS).  
To add concreteness to the measure, we first had participants indicate their own level 
of agreement or disagreement with 24 statements (Appendix B). These statements dealt with 
controversial and emotive topics, including economics (“Every worker should be legally 
guaranteed a minimum wage, whatever job they do”), morality (“It is healthy for people to 
have multiple sexual partners”), and religion (“God—an eternal and all-powerful being—
exists”). Statements were balanced such that about half asserted a left-wing position, and 
about half a right-wing position. Participants responded by clicking one of seven radio 
buttons (strongly disagree, generally disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor 
disagree, somewhat agree, generally agree, strongly agree). These responses were scaled 
from -3 to + 3. 
Thereafter, participants rated their attitudes towards their ideological opponents on 
each of the aforementioned 24 topics—in one block regarding their intelligence (α = .89), and 
in another block regarding their morality (α = .87). As a preamble, participants were 
reminded that people differ in terms of how stupid or smart (bad or good) they are, making 
them more or less likely to hold particular opinions. Participants were then asked to imagine 
people who disagreed with them about each statement—in particular, people who held 
exactly the opposite of their own opinion, whatever their own opinion was. Afterwards, 
participants were instructed to estimate on average how stupid or smart these people were in 
terms of their mental ability, due to not being able, or being able, to understand the relevant 
issues. They were also instructed, separately, to estimate on average how bad or good these 
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people were in terms of their moral character, due to their being bad people, or good people, 
in their approach to the relevant issues. In both blocks, participants were then prompted with 
the stem “I think the type of people who disagree with me, who think the exact opposite of 
what I do about this statement, are...” They responded by clicking one of seven radio buttons 
(much stupider [worse] than average, generally stupider [worse] than average, somewhat 
stupider [worse] than average, neither much stupider [worse] nor much smarter [better] 
than average, somewhat smarter [better] than average, generally smarter [better] than 
average, much smarter [better] than average.) These responses were scaled from -3 to + 3. 
Results and Discussion 
Independent Variables  
Overall, participants regarded both status and inclusion as something that they 
possessed more than they lacked (i.e., their ratings thereof were significantly above the 
midpoint of the scale), respectively, (M = +.17, SD = .77), t(719) = 6.10, p < .001, d = .23, 
and (M = +.59, SD = .72), t(719) = 21.84, p < .001, d = .81, with the latter exceeding the 
former, t(719) = 18.65, p < .001, d = .70. In addition, the independent variables correlated 
substantially, r(718) = .68, p < .001. 
Dependent Variables 
Overall, participants regarded their ideological opponents as being below average 
both in intelligence (i.e., more stupid than smart), (M = -.43, SD = .67), t(716) = -16.98, p < 
.001, d = .63, and in morality (i.e., more bad than good), (M = -.35, SD = .60), t(694) = -
15.38, p < .001, d = .58. That is, on both dimensions, participants derogated their ideological 
opponents (Figure 1). In addition, they denigrated their opponents’ intelligence more than 
their morality (i.e., regarded them as more stupid than bad), t(688) = 4.31, p < .001, d = .16. 
Finally, the two dependent variables correlated substantially, r(687) = .72, p < .001. 
Hypothesized Links 
At the level of raw correlations, both independent variables covaried with both 
dependent variables. In particular, status covaried positively both with ratings of the 
intelligence of ideological opponents, r(713) = .17, p < .001, and with ratings of their 
morality, r(691) = .17, p < .001. So too did inclusion, r(713) = .11, p = .002, and r(691) = .09, 
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p = .023. However, the correlation for status exceeded those for social inclusion, both for 
intelligence, Z = 1.98, p = .047, and for morality, Z = 2.64, p = .008.4 Moreover, in 
simultaneous regressions—featuring as predictors status, inclusion, plus a term to represent 
their interaction (i.e., their centred cross-product)—only status remained predictive, both of 
the intelligence of ideological opponents, β = .18, p < .001 (other ps > .70) and of their 
morality, β = .20, p < .001 (other ps > .20).  
Thus, the hypothesized link was present: status covaried positively with less 
derogation of ideological opponents. Furthermore, the hypothesized link exceeded in extent 
the comparison link with inclusion. Finally, the hypothesized link specifically persisted, 
essentially unchanged in magnitude, when put into competition with this comparison link, 
which became non-significant. Accordingly, the pattern of results was fully consistent with 
our linguistic hierometer hypothesis.  
STUDY 2 
In Study 1, we operationalized our variables as enduring traits and used a correlational 
design. We established the predicted link between status and more positive evaluations of 
ideological opponents. We also established that it was large compared to the parallel link 
featuring inclusion, and that it persisted specifically even when controlling for that link. 
Nonetheless, to substantiate our linguistic-hierometer hypothesis further, we implemented in 
Study 2 an experimental design, and operationalized our variables at the level of temporary 
states, so as to investigate the causality entailed by our hypothesis. In particular, we 
attempted a conceptual replication of Study 1 by manipulating levels of status and examining 
subsequent effects on evaluations of ideological opponents. To complement Study 1, we also 
manipulated inclusion, orthogonally to status, as a comparative benchmark. We hypothesized 
that higher as opposed to lower status would lead respectively to lesser or greater derogation 
of ideological opponents, both absolutely, and relative to inclusion. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 346 undergraduates at the University of Southampton. Twenty-five 
guessed the purpose of the study, and a further four encountered technical problems, leading 
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to the exclusion of their data. The final sample therefore comprised 317 individuals (246 
female, 71 male; Mage = 19.55, SDage = 2.83). This N permitted us to detect a medium-sized 
between-group difference (d = .50) at a conventional alpha level (α = .05) with a strong 
probability (P > .87). 
Procedure 
We advertised two separate studies, respectively entitled “Which Way is your Life 
Heading” and “Theories, Issues, and Evidence.” In fact, both comprised a single study, 
respectively featuring the experimental manipulation and dependent measures.  
On arriving at the laboratory, participants were given a carefully contrived cover story. 
They were informed that, in collaboration with a London-based company, the university was 
administering a highly accurate and reliable scientific test that assessed a person’s overall 
potential to achieve status and inclusion in their lives (cf. Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & 
Stucke, 2001). To enhance credibility, and ensure comprehension, participants read a fake 
journal article that described the test and its ability to predict overall people’s potential to 
achieve status and inclusion in their lives, and then signed a fake declaration form agreeing 
for their data to be added to the company’s database. Subsequently, participants were 
escorted to separate cubicles and completed the test over computer. The test given was high 
in verisimilitude, featuring both Intelligence Quotient-relevant (e.g., vocabulary tests) and 
Emotional Quotient-relevant items (e.g., emotion perception). After about 20 minutes, a small 
clock appeared on the screen, and participants waited 5 seconds while the computer 
ostensibly scored their results. They then received the randomly-generated feedback over 
computer. Thereafter, participants were directed to a “Finish” screen and informed the 
experimenter that they had completed the first study. They proceeded to complete the second 
study, which contained the dependent measures, also over computer. A thorough suspicion 
check and debriefing concluded the experimental session.  
Experimental Manipulations 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions defined by a 2 (status: 
high, low) × 2 (inclusion: high, low) between-subjects design. Respective condition ns were: 
high status/high inclusion = 72; high status/low inclusion = 78; low status/high inclusion = 84; 
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and high status/low inclusion = 83. We counterbalanced feedback order, but, as it did not 
interact with any effects, do not discuss it further. 
 In each condition, participants received a quantitative percentile score, a qualitative 
interpretation of this score, and a diagrammatic representation of these scores. (We had 
previously determined optimal quantitative percentile scores, in terms of credibility and 
motivation, in a pilot study.) Accordingly, we set scores for the high-status and high-
inclusion conditions at the 90th percentile (plus-or-minus 1, to defuse suspicion), and scores 
for the low-status and low-inclusion conditions at the 35th percentile (again plus-or-minus 1). 
We accompanied these quantitative percentile scores with corresponding qualitative 
interpretations several paragraphs long, highlighting the key words and incorporating high-
quality diagrams. To ensure comparability, we carefully matched all conditions in other 
respects—quantitatively, textually, and visually, and for content format, length, style, 
phrasing, and mode of delivery. 
Dependent Measures  
Ostensibly as part of a different study, participants completed the DIOS (intelligence: 
α = .86; morality: α = .86) as described in Study 1.5 
Results 
Manipulation Checks  
The orthogonal manipulations worked. High-status participants (M = +2.48, SD = 
1.14) believed their overall potential for status to be higher than low-status participants (M = 
+.64, SD = 1.81), F(1, 314) = 114.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .267. Likewise, high-inclusion 
participants (M = +2.59, SD = 1.22) believed their overall potential for inclusion to be higher 
than low-inclusion participants (M = +.75, SD = 1.78), F(1, 314) = 114.72, p < .001, ηp2 
= .268.6 
Attitudes to Ideological Opponents 
Replicating Study 1, participants regarded their ideological opponents as being below 
average both in intelligence (M = -.58, SD = .61), t(315) = -17.05, p < .001, d = .96, and in 
morality (M = -.61, SD = .59), t(315) = -18.36, p < .001, d = 1.03. However, unlike in Study 
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1, they did not significantly differ in how much they denigrated their opponents’ intelligence 
and morality, t(315) = 0.973, p = .331, d =.063. 
We conducted a pair of parallel 2 x 2 factorial ANOVAs to gauge the impact of our 
manipulations of status and inclusion on participants’ evaluations of ideological opponents. 
Main effects emerged for status for both intelligence, F(1, 312) = 5.52, p = .019, ηp2 = .017, 
and morality, F(1, 312) = 5.05, p = .025, ηp2 = .016. Moreover, both were in the hypothesized 
direction. Specifically, participants denigrated the intelligence and morality of their 
ideological opponents less when their status was high (respectively: M = -.66, SD = 0.62; M = 
-.68, SD = 0.59) than when it was low (respectively: M = - .50, SD = 0.65; M = -.53, SD = 
0.58). In contrast, no corresponding effects emerged for inclusion on intelligence, F(1, 312) = 
0.04, p =.834, ηp2 = .000, or morality, F(1, 312) = 0.91, p = .342, ηp2 = .003. Finally, no other 
effect attained significance. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 2, featuring an experimental design, dovetailed with those of 
Study 1, featuring a correlational design. Status independently predicted less derogation of 
ideological opponents, whereas inclusion—a good comparative benchmark—independently 
predicted neither. Thus, our linguistic hierometer hypothesis was again supported. Moreover, 
the results of Study 2, in virtue of incorporating an experimental design, provided stronger 
evidence for the causality underlying our hypothesis. 
STUDY 3 
According to our linguistic hierometer hypothesis, higher status diminishes the 
derogation of ideological opponents by augmenting the proponent’s rhetoric handling 
prowess. Hence, for the hypothesis to be tested fully, rhetoric handling prowess requires 
operationalization. In the absence of any pre-existing operationalizations, we set about 
crafting our own measure.  
Someone high in rhetoric handling prowess is liable to feel comfortable getting into 
arguments with ideological opponents, and well able to deal with them, sensing they can hold 
their own in the battle of wits; in contrast, someone who is low in rhetoric handling prowess 
is liable to be fazed or upset by the disagreements aired, and to have their confidence shaken, 
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finding the experience to be a big deal. Equally, someone high in rhetoric handling prowess 
is liable to feel that they have nothing to fear from those who think the opposite of them, and 
is unlikely to be intimidated by them; in contrast, someone who is low in rhetoric handling 
prowess is liable to be scared of people who disagree with them, regarding them as 
dangerous individuals who are capable of hurting them.  
Accordingly, we generated a set of items that tapped into respondents’ dispositional 
tendencies to exhibit such self-possessed or fearful reactions to the prospect of argumentation 
with ideological opponents. In so doing, we sought to meet the qualitative criteria of face 
validity, expressive clarity, and a presumed relation with the proposed construct (Appendix 
C). From these items, we then sought to devise a self-report scale of sufficient psychometric 
soundness to capture adequately meaningful differences in rhetoric handling prowess: the 
Rhetoric Handling Prowess Scale (RHaPS). To achieve this, we ran Study 3 where we did 
the following: analyzed the individual properties of the items; determined the factor structure 
underlying them; quantified the reliability of the scale featuring them; and established how 
scores on the scale covaried with scores on measures of related constructs in the nearby 
nomological net.  
Method 
Platform, Procedure, and Participants  
The platform was identical to that used in Study 1. We created the platform’s content, 
and administered the consent and debriefing, using iSurvey. We also crowdsourced 
participants (at $.25 apiece) via the leading platform CrowdFlower. We screened data using 
criteria comparable to those in Study 2 (Appendix A). Our final sample comprised 190 
participants. This N permitted us to detect a medium-sized correlation (r = .30) at a 
conventional alpha level (α = .05) with a probability near unity (P > .98). The majority were 
female (65.3%), younger (MAGE = 34.9; SDAGE = 12.8), and Western (USA: 73.2%; UK: 
6.3%; Canada: 11.1%; Others: 9.4%). 
Measures 
Rhetoric Handling Prowess Scale. We devised a preliminary pool of 20 items 
(Appendix C). Participants were informed that these items dealt with people they disagreed 
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with and how they reacted to them. For each item, they were instructed to select the response 
that best described how they reacted in general. Participants responded by clicking one of 
five radio buttons (strongly disagree; generally disagree; neither agree nor disagree; 
generally agree; strongly agree), later scaled from 1 to 5. 
Related scales. In addition, we administered in the same session three other well-
validated scales, two assessing ostensibly related constructs. The first was the Generalized 
Self-Efficacy Scale (GSES; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995), a 10-item measure (α = .89) 
assessing the strength of an individual’s belief in his or her own ability to respond to novel or 
difficult situations, and cope with any associated obstacles or setbacks. Participants 
responded by clicking one of four radio buttons (not at all true, hardly true, moderately true, 
exactly true), later scaled from 1 to 4. The second was the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; 
Conner et al., 2000), a 17-item measure (α = .95) assessing the extent to which individuals 
exhibit symptomatology indicative of social anxiety disorder. Participants responded by 
clicking one of five radio buttons (not at all, a little bit, somewhat, very much, extremely), 
later scaled from 1 to 5. The third was the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), a brief measure of the Big Five personality characteristics 
(extraversion, stability, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness); we consider these 
background dispositional variables. Participants responded by clicking one of five radio 
buttons (strongly disagree; generally disagree; neither agree nor disagree; generally agree; 
strongly agree), later scaled from 1 to 5. 
Results 
Item Analysis  
For items on the RHaPS, scaled 1 to 5, we adopted two relevant guidelines to ensure 
that they exhibited adequate discriminative power: (a) the standard deviation of their scores 
exceeded 1; and (b) the mean of their scores lay between 2 and 4 (Jarvis & Petty, 1996). Of 
the 20 items, all met both guidelines, save for two near misses (variances [18/20]: .94 to 1.30; 
means [20/20]: 2.22 to 3.85). We also adopted two further guidelines to ensure that items 
cohered sufficiently with the remainder of the scale: (a) their item-total correlations (ITC) 
exceeded .30 and (b) their average inter-item correlation (AIIC) exceeded .20. With the 
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exception of one item, all items met both guidelines (ITC [19/20]: .24 to .77; AIIC 
[19/20]: .16 to .50). Thus, the initial pool of items generally exhibited desirable psychometric 
properties. 
Factor Analysis  
We subjected the 20 items to a principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation (in 
case of multiple factors, liable to be correlated, emerged). Three factors emerged with 
eigenvalues exceeding 1, accounting for 44.8%, 11.3%, and 6.69% of the variance 
respectively, and on which 10, 7, and 3 items respectively loaded, with coefficients ranging 
from .38 to .81. To simplify the factor structure, we eliminated the three items loading on the 
last factor, all of which were forward-scored. In addition, we eliminated three further items, 
all loading on the first factor. One was eliminated for not meeting the guidelines for ITC and 
AIIC noted above, and the remaining two (those with the lowest loadings on Factor 1) were 
eliminated to ensure that equal numbers of items remained that were both forward-scored and 
reversed-scores (to minimize acquiescence bias). A follow-up factor analysis of the same 
type on the restricted item set yielded two factors, accounting for 49.5% and 14.6% of the 
variance respectively, such that seven items loaded on each, with coefficients ranging 
from .62 to .96. We interpreted the factors, which correlated at r = -.57, as being as likely to 
reflect the directionality of the wording as much as differing underlying constructs. The 
forward-scored items, reversed-scored items, and all items combined, exhibited respectable 
internal consistencies (respectively, α = .92, α =.88, and α =.92). 
Convergent Validity  
If the RHaPS assessed rhetoric handling prowess, then it should have correlated in the 
predicted direction with measures of similar constructs in the nearby nomological net. In 
particular, it should have correlated positively with the GSES, in virtue of reflecting personal 
confidence while arguing, and negatively with the SPIN, in virtue of reflecting an 
interpersonal fear of arguing. Both these correlations were obtained, respectively, r(188) 
= .60,  p < .001, and r(188) = -.60,  p < .001. Even when simultaneously controlling for all 
five generic personality variables as assessed by the TIPI, these specific convergent links 
persisted, respectively, r(181) = .38, p < .001, and  r(181) = -.37, p < .001. 
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Accordingly, we considered ourselves to have developed a serviceable 14-item self-
report measure of rhetoric handling prowess. Its items were all discriminative and coherent; 
its dual factor structure made interpretative sense; its overall reliability was high; and it 
exhibited strong initial convergent validity, including after controlling for background 
personality variables. On average, participants rated themselves above the mean scores of the 
scale (M = 3.52, SD = 0.77), t(189) = 9.30, p < .001, d = .68. 
STUDY 4 
Studies 1 and 2 both found—in correlational and experimental designs—respectively, 
that higher status predicted less derogation of ideological opponents. The linguistic 
hierometer hypothesis attributes this to higher status augmenting levels of rhetoric handling 
prowess—the construct for which we developed a measure in Study 3. Accordingly, one 
should expect—in a correlational design—measures of status, rhetoric handling prowess, and 
derogation of ideological opponents to be interrelated. In particular, status and rhetoric 
handling prowess should be positively related to one another, and both negatively related to 
the derogation of ideological opponents. Furthermore, one would expect rhetoric handling 
prowess to mediate the link between status and derogation of ideological opponents. In Study 
4, we tested whether these patterns would obtain. Furthermore, given that neither Study 1 nor 
Study 2 found evidence that inclusion confounded status-related effects, we dropped it from 
consideration. 
Method 
Platform, Procedure, and Participants  
The platform was identical to that used in Study 1 and Study 3 (payment: $1.00 
apiece). We screened data similarly (Appendix A). Our final sample comprised 229 
participants. This N permitted us to detect a medium-sized correlation (r = .30) at a 
conventional alpha level (α = .05) with a probability near unity (P > .99). The majority were 
female (55.8%), younger (MAGE = 36.0; SDAGE = 11.5), and Western (USA: 61.1%; UK: 
17.0%; Canada: 17.9%; Others: 4.0%). 
Measures 
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Participants completed the status questionnaire (α = .90), the RHaPS (α = .91), and 
the DIOS (intelligence: α = .91; morality: α = .92).  
Results 
Replicating Studies 1 and 2, participants generally derogated their ideological 
opponents, rating them as both less intelligent (M = -.26, SD = 0.81), t(228) = -4.83, p < .001, 
d = .34, and less moral (M = -.22, SD = 0.81), t(228) = -4.21, p < .001, d = .29, than average. 
As in Study 2, these indices did not statistically differ, t(228) = -1.07, p = .287, d = -.082. 
Correlational Analyses 
Replicating Studies 1 and 2, higher status predicted less denigration of both the 
intelligence, r(227) = .29, p < .001, and morality, r(227) = .26, p < .001, of ideological 
opponents. In addition—and in line with the linguistic hierometer hypothesis—higher status 
predicted greater rhetoric handling prowess, r(227) = .25, p < .001. Finally, in line with that 
hypothesis, greater rhetoric handling prowess predicted less denigration of both the 
intelligence, r(227) = .21, p = .001, and morality, r(227) = .17, p = .012, of ideological 
opponents. Thus, the pattern of raw correlations was consistent with rhetoric handling 
prowess being the mechanism that links status to diminished derogation of ideological 
opponents. 
Mediation Analyses 
To test whether rhetoric handling prowess mediated the effect of status on the 
derogation of ideological opponents, in terms of the denigration of both their intelligence and 
morality, we created two models (Hayes & Preacher, 2013). In each, we entered scores on 
status as the predictor and scores on the RHaPS as mediator. In Model 1, we entered the 
intelligence component of the DIOS as outcome (Figure 1), and in Model 2, the morality 
component (Figure 2). We estimated indirect effects using 5,000 bias-corrected and 
accelerated bootstraps (Hayes, 2009). 
In Model 1, higher status predicted greater rhetoric handling prowess, B = .25, SE = 
.07, t(227) = 3.82, p < .001. This, in turn, predicted less denigration of opponents’ 
intelligence, B = .14, SE = .06, t(226) = 2.35, p = .012. The (partial) direct path between 
status and more favorable evaluations of opponents’ intelligence was positive and significant, 
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B = .24, SE = .06, t(226) = 3.85, p < .001. Most importantly, the indirect (i.e., mediated) path 
between these variables was also positive and significant, B = .036, SE =.02, 95% CI = 
[.0050; .0923]. In Model 2, higher status again predicted greater rhetoric handling prowess, B 
= .25, SE = .07, t(227) = 3.82, p < .001. This is in turn predicted diminished denigration of 
opponents’ morality, B = .10, SE = .06, t(226) = 1.62, p = .107. The (partial) direct path 
between status and favorable evaluations of opponents’ morality was again positive and 
significant, B = .23, SE = .06, t(226) = 3.61, p < .001. Most importantly, however, the indirect 
path between these variables was (marginally) significant, B = .03, SE = .0.02, 95% CI = [-
.0032; .0797]. Thus, the pattern of mediation obtained was broadly consistent with rhetoric 
handling prowess being the mechanism that links status to less derogation of ideological 
opponents. 
Study 5 
Study 4 established that operationalizations of our three key constructs, of a chronic 
or dispositional sort, covaried in a manner predicted by the linguistic hierometer hypothesis, 
thereby offering support for it. However, we had so far only provided, in Study 2, more 
telling experimental evidence that one of these constructs, namely status, causally influenced 
another, namely the ideological derogation of opponents, in the expected direction. Study 5 
sought to supplement this finding. It did so by testing—again by using an experimental 
manipulation—whether status also causally influenced rhetoric handling prowess in the 
expected direction—that is, whether raising or lowering current levels of status also raised 
and lowered state levels of rhetoric handling prowess. The study being conducted online, we 
employed an alternative manipulation of status, in which participants brought to mind ways 
in which their status was either higher or lower. 
Method 
As in previous online studies, we created content using iSurvey, crowdsourced 
participants (at $0.40 apiece) via CrowdflowerTM, and screened data (Appendix A). Our final 
sample comprised 201 participants. This N permitted us to detect a medium-sized between-
group difference (d = .50) at a conventional alpha level (α = .05) with a strong probability 
SOCIAL STATUS AND IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS   21 
 
(P > .94). The majority were female (55.8%), mature adults (MAGE = 39.1; SDAGE = 13.0), and 
Western (USA: 60.7%; UK: 17.9%; Canada: 16.9%; Others: 4.5%). 
Manipulation of Status  
We randomly assigned participants either to a high status (n = 96) or low status (n = 
105) condition. We did so by inviting them to recall respectively an aspect of their lives—an 
event, occasion, or setting—where they felt to have been either (a) particularly respected, 
much admired, and considered important by others (high status), or (b) not particularly 
respected, not much admired, and not considered important by others (low status). 
Participants then listed three keywords to describe this aspect of their lives. On the next 
screen, they then wrote about it in greater detail for at least two minutes. 
Manipulation Check 
To assess the efficacy of status manipulation, we used five of the eight items from our 
status measure (α = .89). We excluded three that directly referred to feeling respected, 
admired, and important, to lessen the possibility that demand characteristics alone would 
induce participants—who would likely have noticed the obvious lexical correspondence—to 
report that the manipulation had worked.  
Rhetoric Handling Prowess Scale 
Participants completed a 14-item modified version of RHaPS (α = .94). We optimized 
it to reflect better the state nature of this variable. The scale began with the general stem, 
“Right now, if someone would disagree with me, I would feel…”. Each item completed this 
general stem with a specific phrase taken from each item constituting the trait version of the 
RHaPS (e.g., “…that I can hold my own”, “…that they might damage me”). We used 
identical response options. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check  
The status manipulation was successful, t(199) = 6.59, p < .001, d = .93. Participants 
in the high status condition (M = 3.69, SD = 0.66) rated their status higher than those in the 
low status condition (M = 2.95, SD = 0.91). 
Rhetoric Handling Prowess  
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The status manipulation led to the predicted changes in rhetoric handling prowess, 
t(199) = 2.29, p = .023, d = .33. Participants in the high status condition reported greater 
rhetoric handling prowess (M = 3.89, SD = 0.74) than those in the low status condition did (M 
= 3.64, SD = 0.79). Accordingly, we obtained more telling evidence of a causal link, 
strengthening the evidence for the linguistic hierometer hypothesis. 
STUDY 6 
Study 2 found a causal link between (higher) status and (reduced) opponent 
derogation. Study 5 found a causal link between (higher) status and (increased) rhetoric 
handling prowess. The purpose of Study 6 was to test for a causal link between (increased) 
rhetoric handling prowess and (decreased) opponent derogation. 
Method 
As before, we created content using iSurvey, crowdsourced participants (at $0.20 
apiece) via CrowdflowerTM, and screened data (Appendix A). Our final sample comprised 
160 participants. This N permitted us to detect a medium-sized between-group difference (d 
= .50) at a conventional alpha level (α = .05) with a strong probability (P > .88). The majority 
were female (59.7%), mature adults (MAGE = 42.4; SDAGE = 13.3), and Western (USA: 59.4%; 
UK: 18.8%; Canada: 15.6%; Others: 6.2%). 
Manipulation of Rhetoric Handling Prowess  
We randomly assigned participants to conditions where rhetoric handling prowess 
was made either high (n = 83) or low (n = 77). We did so by inviting them to think of three 
people with whom they disagreed (whose initials they indicated) and with whom they may 
have had, or were likely to have, a social interaction. In the high rhetoric handling prowess 
condition, the interaction was described as one where participants took the conversation in 
their stride, stayed calm, kept their composure, and felt secure. In the low rhetoric handling 
prowess condition, the interaction was described as one where participants felt frightened and 
apprehensive, or got rattled and bullied, during the course of the conversation. On the next 
screen, they then wrote about the interaction in greater detail for at least two minutes. 
Manipulation Check  
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To assess the efficacy of our manipulation of rhetoric handling prowess, we used the 
modified version of the RHaPs featured in Study 5. The terms used in the manipulation, 
although they conceptually mapped on to rhetoric handling prowess, did not use any of the 
words in the RHaPS itself. As in Study 5, this lessened the possibility that demand 
characteristics alone would induce participants to report that the manipulation had worked. 
Derogation of Ideological Opponent Scales 
Participants completed the DIOS (intelligence: α = .94; morality: α = .94) as described 
in Study 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
The manipulation of rhetoric handling prowess (α = .93) was successful, t(158) = 4.81, 
p = .001, d = .77. Participants in the high rhetoric handling prowess condition (M = 3.62, SD 
= 0.82) evinced higher RHaPS scores than those in the low rhetoric handling prowess 
condition (M = 2.98, SD = 0.86). 
Derogation of Ideological Opponents 
Replicating previous studies, participants generally derogated their ideological 
opponents, rating them as both less intelligent (M = -.34, SD = 1.02), t(159) = -4.26, p < .001, 
d = .34, and less moral (M = -.32, SD = 0.96), t(159) = -4.22, p < .001, d = .33, than average. 
Moreover, these indices did not statistically differ, t(159) = -0.49, p = .627, d = -.04. 
Contrary to prediction, however, the manipulation of rhetoric handling prowess had 
no significant effect on the degree to which participants denigrated their ideological 
opponents, either in terms of their intelligence, t(158) = .26, p = .798, d = .02, or their 
morality, t(158) = .40, p = .689, d = .03. Accordingly, we did not obtain experimental 
evidence of a causal link between rhetoric handling power and opponent derogation. 
Nonetheless, rhetoric handling prowess, as captured in the manipulation check, covaried 
positively (albeit directionally) with evaluations of opponents’ intelligence, r(158) = .13, p = 
.11, and positively (plus significantly) with evaluations of opponents’ morality, r(158) = .19, 
p = .018. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Summary of Findings 
People hold those with whom they disagree on important topics in lower regard than 
those with whom they agree (Garcia et al., 2015; Grossmann & Hopkins, 2015). This is but 
one example of how dissimilarities can drive an interpersonal wedge between people 
(Montoya & Horton, 2013). Here, we asked the question of how social status—the extent to 
which people are respected, admired, and considered important by others (Anderson et al., 
2015)—moderates this consequential effect. We derived a directional hypothesis from an 
extension of hierometer theory. In its original form, hierometer theory posits that, via the 
psychological mediation of self-esteem, higher status makes people feel more capable of 
entering into competitive contests over scarce resources, whereas lower status makes them 
feel less capable of doing so. Such a dynamic arguably serves an evolutionarily adaptive 
function, given that people with higher status will typically have at their disposal both 
interpersonal and material wherewithal that people with lower status will lack, likely to 
increase their chances of winning competitive contests (Mahadevan et al., 2016). As a 
consequence, higher status should lead people to construe opponents as more defeatable and 
hence less fearsome, which all else equal should translate into a less negative attitude towards 
them. However, among articulate human mammals, competitive contests take linguistic as 
well as physical form (Gregg et al., 2017). This is shown, among other things, by the 
aggressive metaphorical vocabulary used to describe argumentation (Abelson, 1986). But if 
so, then higher status should also lead people to regard ideological opponents as less 
fearsome, which should all else equal reduce the extent to which they derogate them.  
The results were informative. First, every time we tested for it (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 6), 
we found, as might be expected, that people on the whole derogated their ideological 
opponents—evaluating them as being both less intelligent and less moral than average. 
Second, and again every time we tested for it, we found that status moderated this link in the 
hypothesized direction. In particular, higher status entailed reduced opponent derogation, 
both correlationally (Studies 1 and 4) and experimentally (Study 2). Furthermore, we 
obtained evidence that this link was not due to inclusion—another key social variable with 
which status covaries. Thus, our primary prediction was confirmed.  
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But not only did we propose that high status would reduce opponent derogation, we 
also proposed why. On the basis of an extension of hierometer theory (Mahadevan et al., 
2016), we predicted that higher status would increase rhetoric handling prowess—feeling 
more confident and less intimidated while arguing—which would in turn reduce opponent 
derogation. We accordingly developed and validated a scale to assess rhetoric handling 
prowess (Study 3). Scores on this scale statistically mediated the predicted link between 
status and opponent derogation (albeit marginally for evaluations of morality; Study 4). Also, 
experimentally raising and lowering perceived status (via a recall-based manipulation) raised 
and lowered rhetoric handling prowess in the predicted direction (Study 5). However, 
experimentally raising and lowering perceived rhetoric handling prowess (using a similar 
type of manipulation) did not raise and lower opponent derogation (Study 6), although levels 
of measured rhetoric handling prowess (assessed via a manipulation check) did show links to 
opponent derogation in the predicted direction. Our findings, then, were substantially, but not 
entirely, in accord with predictions.  
Our findings add to the literature that seeks to weigh whether higher status, and 
related constructs such as power, is a source of prosocial or antisocial behavior more 
generally (Anicich et al., 2016; Fast et al., 2016). Matters can get complicated. For example, 
Hays and Blader (2017) found that higher status promoted generosity, but only when it was 
perceived as illegitimate; in contrast, when status was perceived as legitimate, it attenuated 
generosity. In the first case, the authors argued, participants sought to restore equality, but in 
the latter case, were convinced of their superior value. But possibly most pertinent here is the 
research of Henry (2009). His primary contention is that people on the bottom of the social 
ladder are in socially precarious position, forever fearing they may fall off the bottom rung. 
Accordingly, they are especially vigilant to social threats, and are more prone to react to them 
with violence. Moreover, echoing hierometer theory, Henry posits a role for self-esteem as 
psychological mediator. In keeping with his thesis, greater levels of disparity in 
socioeconomic status—which correlate with self-reported levels of status (Mahadevan, Gregg, 
& Sedikides, 2017b)—predict more violent crime, both within the US, and across the world, 
even controlling for average levels of affluence. Even more tellingly, when people in a 
SOCIAL STATUS AND IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS   26 
 
laboratory experiment were asked to recall a situation where “something happened that made 
you to feel really important and valuable,” the pre-existing link between socioeconomic 
status, and proneness to respond aggressively to insults, disappeared. Bolstering a sense of 
status and self-worth made participants better disposed towards other people whose words 
disturbed them, and not merely in terms of how they judged others, but also in terms of how 
they were prepared to behave towards them. 
Theoretical and Empirical Connections 
 We derived our hypothesis explicitly from an extension of hierometer theory. 
However, it is possible to discern, in the nearby nomological net, theories and findings that 
resonate with our own, insofar as they also deal with one or another of the three key elements 
of our investigation: the threat posed by ideological opponents, the vulnerability conferred by 
lower status, or the mediating role played by self-conception. We focus here on just two: 
terror management theory and intergroup theories. Reflecting on these resonances helps to 
contextualize our finding, and suggests fruitful avenues for research. 
Terror Management Theory. Terror management theory (TMT: Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015) starts from the 
premise that the cognitive capacities that facilitate humans’ unique ability to understand and 
master the world nonetheless have a chilling downside: they also make them aware of their 
inevitable death and imply that their life lacks meaning. This invites the perpetual possibility 
of experiencing a paralyzing fear that is less than adaptive. To allay it durably, TMT claims 
humans cleave to cultural worldviews that promise literal or symbolic immortality, if only 
they successfully meet the standards of value that those worldviews prescribe, whereupon 
their self-esteem and sense of meaning are restored. Empirical evidence for TMT derives, in 
part, from the fact that making thoughts of mortality salient prompts defence of various 
aspects of this cultural anxiety buffer (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010), and conversely that 
threats to this cultural anxiety buffer make thoughts of mortality more mentally accessible 
(Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010). 
TMT potentially enriches the current findings and explanation by specifying a further 
reason for why ideological opponents might evoke resentment, and for why higher status 
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might alleviate it. First, those who credibly rebut one’s attitudes on important issues may, in 
so doing, be challenging the overall soundness of worldviews crucial for existential security, 
which are precariously premised on the truth of particular attitudinal positions. If so, then 
decisive arguments against those attitudes become, in effect, existential threats, and those 
who wield them, mortal enemies. Accordingly, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Veeder, Kirkland, 
and Solomon (1990, Studies 2 and 3) found that making mortality salient exacerbated 
participants’ differential fondness for targets who shared an array of attitudes over those who 
did not, as well as for targets who praised their home nation over those who criticized it. 
Second, to the extent that people achieve status, they by definition evoke the admiration and 
respect of others, and are regarded as important (Anderson et al., 2015). However, the most 
reliable way to evoke these reactions is actually to produce goods and services, of either a 
material or social sort, which are themselves considered important (e.g., high-quality 
merchandise, competent group leadership). But this necessarily entails meeting standards of 
value prescribed by widely shared cultural worldviews. Hence, being considered important 
by many people facilitates the inference that one’s own life’s matters too. One’s self-
esteem—a known tracker of status (Mahadevan et al., 2016) and soother of anxiety 
(Greenberg et al., 1992; Routledge et al., 2010)—rises, thereby dampening the impact of 
mortality salience. Accordingly, Harmon-Jones et al. (1997, Study 2) found that participants’ 
differential fondness for those who praised their home nation over those who criticized it was 
once again exacerbated by mortality salience, except among those whose self-esteem was 
dispositionally high rather than moderate, shielding them from existential threat. The impact 
of ideological disagreement goes beyond mere derogation. For example, McGregor et al. 
(1998, Study 1) found that participants allocated greater quantities of tongue-stringing hot 
sauce to (fictitious) targets with an alleged aversion to spicy food, if they were led to believe 
that those targets had disparaged political views that they endorsed rather than opposed, but, 
again, only after (existentially threatening) thoughts of mortality had first been made salient. 
Future research attempting to coordinate hierometer theory and TMT could profitably explore 
the impact of manipulations of status (see Studies 2 and 5) on the accessibility of thoughts of 
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mortality, as well as the impact of mortality salience on levels of compensatory status 
aspiration. 
Intergroup Theories. The present research addressed derogation of ideological 
opponents, albeit within an individualistic framework. Similar dynamics, however, might be 
observed at an intergroup level. In support of this assertion, some of the TMT findings 
reported above—involving praise and criticism of their home nation—held only for 
participants who identified with their nation (Hohman & Hogg, 2015). More generally, under 
the rubric of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 2010), it is well 
established that perceptions of outgroup threat—including those of a purely symbolic sort, 
reflecting antithetical values rather than economic competition (Kinder & Sears, 1981)—are 
keys predictors of outgroup derogation (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). In addition, self-
reports of greater socioeconomic fear predict increased derogation of an immigrant outgroup 
(Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015). Finally, some findings also suggest that 
constructs related to higher status may sometimes predict less outgroup derogation. For 
example, Bahns and Crandall (2013) found that straight people, who were higher as opposed 
to lower in social dominance orientation, showed greater tolerance for gay people, as long as 
gay people were portrayed as posing little threat. That said, overall high status groups 
probably show more pronounced outgroup discrimination (Bettencourt Dorr, Charton, & 
Hume, 2001). It remains to be seen whether collective ingroup status per se, measured or 
manipulated, is associated with greater or less derogation of outgroups, where the criterion 
for differentiation is ideological in nature. For example, if Whites and Blacks were led to 
believe that Blacks had recently been accorded in society greater respect, admiration, and 
importance relative to Whites, a researcher would predict, by extrapolation from our own 
findings, that this belief would exacerbate any outgroup derogation of Blacks by Whites, but 
attenuate any outgroup derogation of Whites by Blacks. One would expect such effects to be 
mediated, moreover, by collective esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). 
Conclusion 
The saying goes that “sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never 
hurt me.” However, human beings are unique in the sense that mere words have the capacity 
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to wound them—and not merely when those words convey insulting slurs, but simply when 
they convey credible propositions that cast doubt upon cherished beliefs. When this happens, 
there is a temptation to blame the messenger; hence, ideological opponents are derogated. 
However, when people are generally esteemed by others in a particular way—when they are 
respected, admired, and considered important—such derogation abates. That is, higher status 
makes people less derogating towards those who contradict them on important topics. 
Furthermore, they are some signs that this is so, because high status makes people feel they 
are more capable of dealing with the fallout of disagreement. That is, higher status permits 
people to, metaphorically speaking, “take the high ground”—a secure vantage point from 
which rhetorical threats are easier to survey and parry. 
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Footnotes 
1 A brief word here is in order on two other factors that contribute to social 
stratification. These are social power—which may be defined as one’s capacity to 
asymmetrically control other people’s outcomes (Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015)—and 
social class—which may be defined as one’s semi-permanent economic, occupational, or 
cultural position relative to other people (Kraus & Stephens, 2012). Both are conceptually 
differentiable from one another and from status, while also being naturally intercorrelated 
with it and reciprocally influential (Fiske, Dupree, Nicolas, & Swencionis, 2016; Kraus, Piff, 
& Keltner, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Ridgeway, 2014). Note that here, the capacity to 
call upon fans might be considered an addition to one’s social power, and resources earned 
from those fans might be considered a contribution to one’s social class. Whether and to what 
extent these elements mediate the effects of status prescribed by hierometer theory is a fertile 
subject for future research. 
2 Dominance theory (Barkow, 1980), although it posits that prestige-based status 
(which it confusingly refers to as “dominance,” thereby confounding social and behavioral 
levels of analysis [Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2016], and muddying the distinction 
between dominance and prestige hierarchies [De Waal-Andrews, Gregg, & Lammers, 2015]) 
is an antecedent of self-esteem, does not explicitly posit that it operates to regulate entry into 
competitive contests with conspecifics. If anything, it suggests that self-esteem operates to 
regulate such contest-entry homeostatically, such that people with lower status, and hence 
self-esteem, should be more (not less) likely to enter into such contests, so as to gain status.   
3 Our measures were administered as part of larger investigation of intellectual 
humility. A full list of measures is available from the authors 
4 We used Hoerger’s (2013) slightly optimized variant of the test for the difference 
between dependent correlations, pioneered by Steiger (1980). 
5 The DIOS was a one of several measures administered as part of larger investigation 
of intellectual humility. 
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6 Low-status participants rated their potential for inclusion higher (M = +1.86, SD = 
1.82) did high-status participants (M = +1.43, SD = 1.93), F(1, 314) = 4.61, p = .033, ηp2 
= .014, Also, low-inclusion participants rated their potential for status (M = +1.68, SD = 1.57) 
marginally higher than high-inclusion participants (M = +1.35, SD = 1.97), F(1, 314) = 2.70, 
p = .101, ηp2 = .009. However, this reverse cross-over effect was comparatively minor, 
relative to the primary impact of the manipulations on their corresponding manipulation 
checks (i.e., effect sizes were an order of magnitude smaller). 
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Figure 1 
Study 1: Frequency distributions representing participants’ evaluation of the intelligence and 
the morality of their ideological opponents relative to the average person.  
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Figure 2 
Study 4: The role of rhetoric handling prowess in mediating the link between social status 
and ratings of opponents’ intelligence and morality 
 
 
Note. In all models, effects were estimated using 5000 bias-corrected and accelerated 
bootstraps with standardized (z) scores of the variables (Efron, 1987). Values in the models 
represent beta coefficients. Values within parentheses represent the strength of the association 
between the predictor variable and outcome variable before the mediator was included in the 
model, whereas values outside parentheses represent the strength of the association when the 
mediator was included in the model. Social status was entered as an exogenous variable. 
Security with disagreement and attitudes to opponents were entered as endogenous variables 
and are indicated with error terms. Goodness of fit indices are inapplicable because the 
models are saturated models with zero degrees of freedom (Kline, 2005, p. 133).  
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Appendix A 
Further Information about Online Screening of Data from Studies 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
 
 
  Exclusion Criteria 
 
 
    
 Authentic 
Cases 
Skipped 
Content 
Participated 
Repeatedly 
 
Finished 
Hastily  
Responded 
Mindlessly 
Met Other 
Criteria 
Final 
Sample 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Study 1*        
N  1577 37 564 66 418 39 722 
%  100% 2.4% 35.8% 4.2% 26.5% 2.5% 45.8% 
         Study 3        
N  214 7 8 1 12 0 190 
%  100% 3.3% 3.7% 0.5% 5.6% 0.0% 88.8% 
         Study 4        
N  316 8 47 37 19 0 229 
%  100% 2.5% 14.9% 11.7% 6.0% 0.0% 72.5% 
         Study 5        
N  253 1 27 19 7 0 201 
%  100% 0.4% 10.7% 7.5% 2.8% 0.0% 79.5% 
         Study 6        
N  199 4 0 3 34 0 160 
% 100% 2.0% 0.0% 1.5% 17.1% 0.0% 80.4% 
           
Note. Authentic cases were defined as those in which participants completed at least half of 
all items (to rule out completions reflecting curiosity or reconnaissance). All other figures are 
computed from this baseline. Participants were defined as having skipped content if they 
completed fewer than 90% of items on a survey (95% in Study 1); as having participated 
repeatedly if another case shared the same IP address; as having finished hastily if they 
completed the survey in less than a third of the median time taken (half in Study 1) for that 
survey overall; as having responded mindlessly if they identically answered all items on any 
questionnaire long enough to expect some variance; as having met other criteria if they 
exhibited an assortment of other problems, including participants reporting being under the 
age of 18 or being poor at English, or data qualifying as a multivariate outlier based on 
SOCIAL STATUS AND IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS   44 
 
extreme Mahalanobis distance (α < .001). Note that participants could be excluded on 
multiple grounds, so that additivity is not to be expected. 
Appendix A (cont.) 
Further Information about Online Screening of Data from Studies 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
* Legal requirements imposed by the University of Southampton required that Study 
1 be run on CrowdFlower in multiple stages, thereby permitting the same participants to 
complete it more than once in principle; however, the number that then did so in practice 
greatly exceeded expectations (i.e., the CrowdFlower sampling pool was not as large as 
expected), thereby inflating levels repeated participation and mindless responding. 
Nonetheless, the final carefully screened dataset yielded findings amply testifying to its 
quality (e.g., high Cronbach’s alphas, the replication of well-known correlations on other 
questionnaires administered). 
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Appendix B 
List of 24 Statements used in the Derogation of Ideological Opponents Scale 
1. Every worker should be legally guaranteed a minimum wage, whatever job they do. 
 
2. Ordinary civilians should be legally permitted to own a standard firearm for personal use.  
  
3. People in wealthy countries should seek to reduce the amount of energy that they consume.  
 
4. The institution of marriage is meant for one man and one woman. 
  
5. Abortion should be legally permitted under most or all circumstances. 
 
6. “Hard” drugs like heroin and cocaine, which are addictive and harmful, should be prohibited by law. 
  
7. The richest 10% should be taxed more heavily to help the poorest 10%.     
 
8. People have a moral duty to obey the law. 
     
9. On average, women’s pay should be the same as men’s pay.   
  
10. God—an eternal and all-powerful being—exists. 
     
11. It is healthy for people to have multiple sexual partners.  
 
12. The death penalty should be given for extremely serious crimes like mass murder. 
 
13. Islam is fundamentally a religion of peace.  
 
14. Medical research should include some experimentation on animals.   
 
15. The government should ban the selling of high-calorie drinks in large containers. 
 
16. It should be against the law for doctors to assist their patients in committing suicide. 
 
17. Prostitution should be legal: people should be permitted to buy and sell sexual services. 
 
18. Western powers (like the USA) are right to use drone strikes (attacks involving pilotless planes). 
 
19. When the economy is in a slump, the government should spend money to get it going. 
 
20. Darwin’s theory—of evolution through natural selection—is just an unproven speculation. 
 
21. Criminal suspects should never be tortured under any circumstances.   
 
22. National security agencies should be permitted to monitor private messages over the Internet.  
23. The bargaining power of labor unions should be expanded.    
 
24. Powerful Western nations (like the USA. should intervene abroad to fight injustice and spread democracy.
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Appendix C 
The Rhetoric handling prowess Scale (RHaPS) 
Retained Items (Factor 1: positively phrased) 
1. I am never intimidated by people who disagree with me.  
2. I have nothing to fear from people who think the opposite of me.  
3. I am well able to deal with people who disagree with me. 
4. I am comfortable getting into arguments with people who think the opposite of me.  
5. In debates with people who contradict my view of the world I can hold my own.  
6. If I need to argue with people who disagree with me it doesn't faze me.  
7. Having difficult conversations with people who think the opposite of me is no big deal. 
Retained Items (Factor 2: negatively phrased) 
8. People who contradict my view of the world sometimes scare me. 
9. I am quite rightly afraid of some people who disagree with me.   
10. Now and again, I wonder whether people who think the opposite of me might do me 
damage. 
11. People who contradict my view of the world sometimes strike me as capable of hurting 
me. 
12. I regard people who disagree with me as potentially dangerous individuals. 
13. People who disagree with me often really upset me during the conversations we have. 
14. Sometimes my confidence is shaken by people who contradict my view of the world.  
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Appendix C (cont.) 
The Rhetoric handling prowess Scale (RHaPS) 
Discarded Items 
15. People who contradict my view of the world do not pose any threat to me.  
16. People who disagree with me are not in any position to harm me.  
17. I never regard people who think the opposite of me as a personal menace. 
18. I find it challenging to argue with people who contradict my view of the world.  
19. I just don't know how to handle people who think the opposite of me.  
20. I need to prepare carefully before I talk to people who disagree with me. 
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Appendix D 
Wording and Diagrams Used in Study 2 
High Status Feedback 
The SVI measures overall potential for status. This extends to all social situations, both professional 
and non-professional.  
 
Here, you scored significantly above average—in the 89th percentile—on status-relevant traits and 
behaviours, compared to a national sample of young adults. This means that your long-term potential 
for status is very high—among the top 11% of the population.  
 
People who score in this range typically find it easy to accomplish their occupational and financial 
goals, and commonly become very successful, especially later in life. Long-term, you will probably 
have one or more prestigious, fulfilling careers, and you have a significantly higher than average 
chance of becoming wealthy: scorers in this range usually end up in the top income earners in the 
population, and will achieve complete economic security. 
 
Even if you have not done well in your life so far, as time passes this will change, and you are liable to 
become more and more successful. Your test results show that you 
are more intellectually versatile than most of your peers, and given the right opportunity, can be a 
leader. You will likely be effective and efficient at achieving your goals.  
 
Across your life as a whole, you will also enjoy a high social standing. Prospective friends, romantic 
partners, colleagues, bosses, and even casual acquaintances will respect you, value your opinions and 
ideas, and see you as competent and accomplished. Statistically, you are much more likely than your 
peers to impress others, get recognition, and stand out as important. People will tend to admire you, 
and think highly of your abilities and talents. 
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Appendix D (cont.) 
Wording and Diagrams Used in Study 2 
High Inclusion Feedback 
The SVI measures overall potential for inclusion. This extends to all social situations, both 
professional and non-professional. 
 
Here, you scored significantly above average—in the 91st percentile—on inclusion-relevant traits 
and behaviours, compared to a national sample of young adults. This means that your long-term 
potential for inclusion is very high—among the top 9% of the population. 
 
People who score in this range typically find it easy to form and maintain relationships, and are 
commonly in close contact with many people, especially later in life. Long-term, you will probably go 
on to have many close and fulfilling relationships, and you have a significantly higher than average 
chance of fitting in socially: scorers in this range are several times more likely to end up belonging to 
social groups than the rest of the population.  
 
Even if you have not had many good relationships in your life so far, as time passes this will change, 
and you will find yourself becoming more and more included in social life. Your test results show that 
you are more sympathetic than most of your peers, and liable to be accepted. You will likely be able 
to relate well to other people, and to be good at understanding them.  
 
Across your life as a whole, you will fit well into almost every group you join. Prospective friends, 
romantic partners, colleagues, bosses, and even casual acquaintances will enjoy your company, feel 
warmly towards you, and perceive you as friendly and approachable. Statistically, you are much more 
likely than your peers to be liked, to feel you belong, and to come across as one of the group. People 
will tend to be fond of you, and add you to their social circle. 
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Appendix D (cont.) 
Wording and Diagrams Used in Study 2 
Low Status Feedback 
 
The SVI measures overall potential for status. This extends to all social situations, both professional 
and non-professional.  
 
Here, you scored significantly below average—in the 36th percentile—on status-relevant traits and 
behaviours, compared to a national sample of young adults. This means that your long-term potential 
for status is quite low—among the bottom 36% of the population.  
 
People who score in this range typically find it a challenge to accomplish their occupational and 
financial goals, and commonly encounter failure, especially later in life. Long-term, you will probably 
struggle to build a prestigious, fulfilling career, and you have a significantly higher than average 
chance of facing financial difficulties: scorers in this range often end up among the bottom income 
earners in the population, and the majority will require social assistance (e.g., from the government) at 
some point. 
 
Even if you have done well in your life so far, as time passes this will change, and you are liable to 
find it harder and harder to succeed. Your test results show that you are less intellectually gifted than 
most of your peers, and show little leadership potential. Trying to achieve your goals may cause you 
significant frustration. 
 
Across your life as a whole, you will also tend to have a low social standing. Prospective friends, 
romantic partners, colleagues, bosses, and even casual acquaintances will tend not to respect you, 
may discount your opinions and ideas, or even see you as foolish or inept. Statistically, you are less 
likely than your peers to impress others, get recognition, and stand out as important. People will tend 
to overlook you, and question your abilities and talents. 
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Appendix D (cont.) 
Wording and Diagrams Used in Study 2 
Low Inclusion Feedback 
The SVI measures overall potential for inclusion. This extends to all social situations, both 
professional and non-professional. 
  
Here, you scored significantly below average—in the 34th percentile—on inclusion-relevant traits 
and behaviours, compared to a national sample of young adults. This means that your long-term 
potential for inclusion is quite low—among the bottom 34% of the population.  
  
People who score in this range typically find it a challenge to form and maintain relationships, and 
commonly find themselves isolated, especially later in life. Long-term, you will very probably 
struggle to build many close or fulfilling relationships, and you have a significantly higher than 
average chance of being socially impaired: scorers in this range are several times more likely to end 
up excluded from social groups than the rest of the population.  
  
Even if you have had good relationships in your life so far, as time passes this will change, and you 
will find yourself becoming more and more excluded from social life. Your test results show that you 
are less sympathetic than most of your peers, and in danger of rejection. You will likely have 
difficulty relating to other people, and be poor at understanding them.  
  
Across your life as a whole, you will tend to be an outsider even in the groups you join. Prospective 
friends, romantic partners, colleagues, bosses, and even casual acquaintances will tend to avoid your 
company, be suspicious of you, and perceive you as unfriendly and cold. Statistically, you are less 
likely than your peers to be liked, to feel you belong, and to come across as one of the group. People 
will often take a negative view of you, and keep you at arms’ length. 
 
 
 
 
 
